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ESSAY
PROPERTY AS CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH:
UTILITIES AND DANGERS
Laura S. Underkuffler †
Recently, a revolution has begun in the American study of constitutional law. For many years constitutional scholarship was primarily
an insular domestic concern. However, American scholars and decision makers have suddenly become actively aware of the existence of
constitutional regimes in other countries and the value of studying
those regimes. Just as globalization has become an irresistible force in
politics and commerce, it is fast becoming an irresistible force in the
study of constitutional law as well.
Comparative critiques have played a particularly prominent role
in the roiling world-wide debate over the desirability and meaning of
the constitutional protection of property. Scholars in countries with
established democratic histories, as well as those in fledgling democracies, have engaged in wide-ranging comparative critiques in their efforts to determine answers to difficult questions surrounding the
constitutionalization of property.1
To date, the American scheme of constitutional protection of
property rights has been largely immune from international critique,
at least from scholars within this country. The publication of The
Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence2 has shattered this immunity. I have known of Professor
Alexander’s work on this project for several years and have been eager
† Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University. These remarks were first
presented at the Cornell Law School on September 20, 2006. I am grateful for the richly
insightful and provocative comments that I received on that occasion, as well as those I
received informally from many colleagues about the ideas in this Essay.
1
See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417 (G.E. van
Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996); Thomas Allen, Commonwealth Constitutions and the
Right Not to Be Deprived of Property, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523 (1993); Alexander Alvaro, Why
Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 24 CAN. J. POL.
SCI. 309 (1991); Richard W. Bauman, Property Rights in the Canadian Constitutional Context, 8
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 344 (1992); Matthew Chaskalson, The Problem with Property: Thoughts on
the Constitutional Protection of Property in the United States and the Commonwealth, 9 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 388 (1993); Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, ISR.
STUD., Fall 1998, at 80.
2
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 23 (2006).
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to see the outcome. It does not disappoint. It is a superbly executed
and compelling account of the transnational and transcultural issues
involved in property law and property theory. In addition, it is not
simply a comparative offering. It is also an eloquent statement of the
challenges of, and possible solutions to, critical questions in the American constitutional protection of property. Indeed, readers of Professor Alexander’s book will find it impossible to continue to think of
American takings jurisprudence as an insular body of law, reflecting
only American issues and American concerns.
The book opens with what may strike readers as a surprising question: whether the constitutional protection of property rights, or the
text of particular constitutional property clauses, matters in the degree of protection that property enjoys. This question is surprising
because scholars generally assume that such textual issues are critical
ones. Alexander challenges this assumption by arguing that although
the presence or absence of constitutional protection of property may
affect outcomes, it is far from outcome-determinative.3 For instance,
property enjoys a great deal of protection in New Zealand and Canada, two countries that deliberately omitted property from their lists
of entrenched individual rights.4 By contrast, the United States,
which has had a robust property-protection clause from the beginning, readily redistributes property through taxation, regulation, and
other means. In addition, although text matters, “text alone is not
outcome determinative”;5 rather, “[j]udicial interpretation of a constitutional property clause turns on many factors, among which is its
text.”6 Other factors that influence the interpretive process, such as
“background (non-constitutional) legal and political traditions and
culture,” are at least equally important.7
The book then summarizes American takings law and critiques its
problems from various philosophical and doctrinal perspectives. It
continues with detailed analyses of the treatment of property rights by
the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and the new South African Constitution.8 Both comparative examples are well chosen. The German
system—a post-World War II product—is well developed through extensive judicial interpretation, and commentators generally regard it
both as enjoying a great deal of internal coherence and as a worthy
model for others.9 The South African document, drafted and
adopted within the last twelve years, was the product of unprece3
4
5
6
7
8
9

See id. at 20–21.
See id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 6 (endnote omitted).
See id. at 27.
See id. at chs. 3, 4.
See, e.g., id. at 12.
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dented international consultation and scholarly commentary.10 In addition, the German and South African systems represent political
traditions and aspirations that are sufficiently similar to, but still sufficiently different from, those in the United States as to yield rich and
provocative comparisons. For instance, as Alexander notes, “all three
countries are constitutional democracies with a private property/free
market economic system.”11 Each “recognize[s] the centrality of private property rights while simultaneously undergirding a very different calculus of individual and community interests.”12
Through this comparative exploration, Alexander develops certain lessons for American takings jurisprudence.13 These lessons include particular doctrinal prescriptions. All of these innovations are
used in other legal systems in which property rights are strongly protected, making them “basically congenial with the fundamental commitment of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause[,] . . . . [y]et all . . .
are [also] almost entirely absent from the agenda of issues that dominate American takings law scholarship.”14
First, Alexander suggests the use of a proportionality principle in
American takings cases.15 The proportionality principle—and here, I
shall oversimplify greatly—requires that any prima facie violation of a
constitutional right be justified, “‘considering the importance of the
right, the degree of intrusion, and the nature of the asserted governmental interest.’”16 This principle, which is a central concern in the
constitutional jurisprudence of Germany, South Africa, and other
countries,17 forces the reviewing court to consider transparently the
particular facts, interests, and values that the competing parties
represent.18
Second, Alexander urges the adoption of a purposive approach
in American takings jurisprudence.19 Under this approach, courts
“analyze takings cases by explicitly focusing on the core purpose of
constitutional protection of property, identifying the central constitutional value that such heightened protection is intended to serve, and
asking whether that value is immediately at stake under the circum10
Cf. id. at 155–59 (discussing the intense debate surrounding the adoption of the
property clause and noting the role of academics and international actors in this debate.)
11
Id. at 12.
12
Id.
13
See id. at 199–243.
14
Id. at 199.
15
See id. at 199–214.
16
Id. at 201 (quoting Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583, 608 (1999)).
17
See id. at 200–01.
18
See id. at 202.
19
See id. at 215–23.
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stances before it.”20 This approach would also require transparency in
American takings law, this time in “the [United States Supreme]
Court’s . . . conceptions of the core purposes of constitutional property” protection.21 Alexander observes that “[o]ne of the strongest
points of contrast between American takings law and its counterparts
in Germany and South Africa is that German and South African courts
are consistently and explicitly guided by a purposive approach to analyzing what their constitutions’ commitments to property require in
the immediate case.”22 As a result, the decisions of these courts
demonstrate a consistency and fidelity to the constitutional property
values in question that American decisions do not.23
Third, Alexander argues for a reevaluation of American courts’
compensation practices in light of comparative models. For instance,
German courts may order that the government pay “equalization benefits” to property owners whose challenges to the constitutionality of
government regulations fail but who are nonetheless disproportionately affected by the regulations.24 This, Alexander writes, “directly
addresses the problem that arises when efficiency considerations suggest that a regulation should be held valid but fairness considerations
suggest . . . at least some degree of compensation.”25 The German
courts also display greater flexibility in compensation practices in
their willingness to consider factors such as the degree of personal
attachment to property (for instance, property used for a personal residence as opposed to property held strictly for investment purposes)
and the extent to which pre-existing public subsidies have created the
subject property’s value.26
All of these discussions and prescriptions by Alexander are, in a
sense, content neutral. There is no necessary outcome, in a normative
sense, that results from the questioning of our legal practices or from
the idea of “borrowing” from other jurisdictions. His approach in all
of this is cautious. Even those doctrinal ideas that he does advance—
such as “proportionality” between government means and ends and
an “explicitly purposive analysis” that identifies a property’s central
values—do not, of themselves, necessarily entail any particular vision
of property’s protection, or lack thereof.
He does, however, make one proposal that throws this caution to
the winds. This is the explicit exhortation that American takings jurisprudence should develop an articulated norm of social obligation.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 215.
at 217.
at 218.
at 236.
id. at 240–41.
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“Traces of an implicit social-obligation norm,” Alexander writes,
“are scattered throughout American takings decisions.”27 These
traces are evident, for instance, in the courts’ treatment of historic
preservation laws28 and the responsibilities of owners of land to adjacent landowners.29 However, these examples are a far cry from the
explicit German and South African jurisprudential requirements that
property owners’ interests be seen through the lens of a general norm
of social obligation.30 Indeed, Alexander argues, the failure to explicitly acknowledge the social obligations of ownership is what is most
deficient about American takings jurisprudence.31
The question that immediately arises is, why? If we are to demand
that American takings law overtly adopt a particular normative posture, we must have reasons for that demand. In his book, Professor
Alexander argues primarily—and very convincingly—that the acknowledgment of a social-obligation norm as a formal part of takings
law is necessary to rationalize our takings law and to develop the implicit concerns with social obligation that are already found within
it.32
In this Essay, I advance another reason for this move—one that is
less concerned with the structure of law than with the hurly-burly of
politics. I argue that we should develop an articulated social-obligation norm not only because it would rationalize an irrational situation,
or even because it is a good idea; rather, we should do so because we
must. Political, cultural, legal, and other realities leave us no choice.
We no longer have the luxury of operating with the “mythology” of
property as a free-standing, individually protective, socially acontextual entity. We must explicitly acknowledge property’s other side.
Furthermore, comparative law, as articulated by Professor Alexander
in this book, gives us some ideas of how to do this.
*****
Saying that there is a “problem” in constitutional law that must be
fixed requires that we discover that problem. What is the problem
here? What is wrong with articulating the constitutional protection of
property in terms that focus solely on the individual?
27

Id. at 223.
See, e.g., id. (discussing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271
(N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
29
See, e.g., id. at 225–27 (suggesting that the nuisance exception to the noxious-use
doctrine that Justice Scalia advanced in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1991), “reflects a social-obligation norm”).
30
See, e.g., id. at 97, 131–47, 149, 182–97.
31
See id. at 224.
32
See id. at 224–35.
28
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Indeed, all individual constitutional rights in the American legal
system are designed to protect individuals against the oppressive exercise of government power.33 Whether one thinks of freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, due process of law, the protection of
property, or other rights, the foundational model is the same: these
rights protect the individual’s interests against the dangers of unchecked majoritarian power.
This model necessarily creates certain mythologies. One of these
mythologies, reflected in political rhetoric and popular culture, is that
these individual rights are free-standing entities, defined from the individual’s perspective alone, and, for this reason, absolute or nearly
absolute in nature.34 When politicians or other popular figures speak
of “free speech,” “freedom of religion,” or the “protection of property,” they do not generally intend their appeals to evoke the idea of
rights-in-social-context. Rather, they awaken the image of rights as
protecting separately conceived, separately maintained, and unfairly
beleaguered individual interests.
In most constitutional areas, however, we know—after even momentary reflection—that the mythology of constitutional rights as
purely individual concerns is, in fact, a mythology. Even the most unreflective person knows that one cannot shout “fire” in a theater or
practice a religion that involves cannibalism. The mythology of individualism is there, and it is powerful, but it is tempered by the obvious
reality of social interests. Indeed, we know, on some intuitive level,
that the ideas of free speech, freedom of religion, or due process of
law are themselves essentially social concepts. They deal with, and describe, our interactions with others.
The right to the protection of property, however, is different.
Property, in its common conception,35 not only protects us against
government interference, but also against all others. It is, by its very
nature, bound up with ideas of individual separation, individual isolation, individual autonomy, and individual control. Scholars might argue that property involves social relations, or “the self with others,”36
33
Some, of course, also provide protection against other individuals. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII (forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude).
34
See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128–33 (1990).
35
See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 38–46
(2003) (describing the “common” individually protective conception of property in law).
36
See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 4–7 (1997) (describing
property as a way to choose and support a proper and just social order); Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, in 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 157, 209 (M.D.A. Freeman & R. Halson eds.,
1994) (presenting property as including the values of human dignity and the “sense of the
reciprocal responsibility which each citizen owes to his or her community”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 208–09 (2000) (referring to obligations to others as an inherent part of traditional understandings of property); Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2005) (arguing that property is
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but this is not how the general populace of this country culturally or
reflexively imagines property. And it is not, therefore, the way that
the constitutional protection of property is popularly perceived. The
“right to property” means the protection of possessions, the protection of one’s business, and the protection of expectations to develop
one’s land. This mythology, then, is simply a deep and enduring expression of what we believe as a cultural matter to be the reality of this
right.
Moreover, this mythology is, I would argue, deeply rooted in our
legal understanding of the constitutional right to the protection of
property. Take, for instance, the notorious problem of defining property for constitutional purposes. Although in practice the Supreme
Court has implemented what seems to be its own understanding of
“property,”37 it has repeatedly insisted, as an explicit doctrinal matter,
that we look to private law—state law—to determine what property is
for constitutional purposes.38 Is the right to develop land in a particular situation a constitutionally cognizable property interest?39 Is the
money that could theoretically be earned on one’s principal a constitutionally cognizable property interest?40 U.S. Supreme Court cases
are replete with statements of the “obvious” maxim that private law
creates property interests and the Constitution protects them.41 We
assume that private law defines or creates the “thing” that the individual has at stake. “Property” is a complicated idea that is created by
state-law, private-law, and individually oriented concepts.
intrinsically and robustly social and joins individuals in community); Underkuffler, supra
note 34, at 141 (describing property as encompassing a broad range of human liberties
within a collective context of support and restraint).
37
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (arguing that protected property expectations are “based on objective rules
and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved” and that such
“reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition”);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (citing the “ordinary meaning” of
“the taking of a property interest”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (stating that “[p]roperty rights in a physical thing” include the rights
“to possess, use, exclude, and dispose of it”); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979)
(explaining that property includes the “traditional” bundle of rights).
38
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001) (plurality opinion)
(describing property as the “common, shared understandings . . . derived from a State’s
legal tradition”); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“[T]he existence of a property interest is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980)
(“[T]he several States[ ] [are] possessed of residual authority . . . to define ‘property’ in
the first instance.”).
39
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.6, 1027–30 (citing state law).
40
See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (citing state law).
41
See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 (plurality opinion); Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, 1027–30; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
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Contrast this with, for instance, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, or the right to counsel in criminal cases. In none of these
areas do the courts, rhetorically or otherwise, assume recourse to private law. In these contexts, private law might be a peripheral consideration in public policymaking, but there is no taking of privately
defined interests and concepts and transplanting them as intact units
into public constitutional law. For example, the Court might consider
the private law of libel in determining First Amendment freedom of
the press, but we would never see the Court opine that in determining
the content of the individual’s interest (in free speech, or freedom of
religion, or criminal counsel), we look to private law. Yet this transplantation is exactly what we do—at least as a matter of articulated
policy—with property.
Our conceptions of justice in the context of takings law reflect
another example of this mythology of property in constitutional law.
Our intuitions, along with many federal court opinions, assume that
justice must be a critical part of the American takings question.42 Justice, as it is generally conceived, involves the evaluation of competing
claims.43 As I have previously written, whether a law or its operation is
“just” depends on both the advantages and disadvantages that one
party derives from the operation of that law (or its absence), and the
advantages and disadvantages that other parties experience.44 For instance, when examining what the right to counsel means in a criminal
case, we consider the interests of the accused and the interests of the
public in determining whether a particular interpretation of this guarantee is just.45 Justice is, in other words, an “inherently relational inquiry.”46 When considering “justice” in law, it is incoherent to
evaluate the claims of one party without reference to the other.47
Yet, that is exactly what the articulated “justice” inquiry in American takings law has traditionally done.48 The question, as we have
heard it time and again, is whether the government has gone “too far”
42
The most famous invocation of justice in takings cases is found in Armstrong v.
United States, in which the Court stated that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960); accord, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 526
U.S. 687, 702 (1999); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
43
See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property
and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 749–51 (2004).
44
See id. at 749.
45
See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (analyzing the right to counsel
with regard to police attempts to elicit statements from criminal defendants).
46
See Underkuffler, supra note 43, at 749 (emphasis omitted).
47
See id.
48
See id. at 747–52.
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in damaging the property owner’s interests.49 Has the landowner lost
too much value? Has the owner of a chattel or principal lost too many
rights? We are concerned with what the complaining property owner
has lost but not with what the public has lost. Indeed, the idea of
“public justice” in the takings context seems like an oxymoron. As a
popular and cultural matter, we assume agreement with Justice
Scalia’s famous statement that to be concerned with public interests in
these cases is to be concerned with protecting the “profit” of the
“thief.”50 This is true even though the proposed actions of the property owner—for instance, engaging in environmentally damaging
coastal development, or the draining of wetlands, or the destruction
of historic buildings—may in fact make that owner more aggressor
than victim.
The mythology of property as a free-standing entity, defined from
the individual perspective alone, and nearly absolute in nature is thus
a bedrock feature of the way that we envision the constitutional protection of property, in a way that is not true of other rights. That, I
would argue, is the truth. It is also a tremendous irony.
It is ironic because this mythology is, in fact, less true of property
than any other constitutional right. For instance, it is at least possible
to envision free speech, freedom of religion, or due process of law in
purely private terms. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and
due process of law are freedoms that individuals can naturally, individually, and equally enjoy. There is no necessary additional cost that
society or any particular individual incurs if another person believes
freely, or speaks freely, or is afforded the protection of the laws.
These are freedoms that, in their essence and their necessary exercise,
we can at least conceive in purely individual terms.
Property is very different. When property involves external, physical, finite resources—as most of it does—it is, in fact, impossible to
conceive of it in wholly private terms. If the law protects the enjoyment of a particular resource by one person, then it denies the enjoyment of that same resource by another. If the law upholds my right to
possess this land, it necessarily denies your claim to possess that land.
If it upholds my right to clear timber, deplete species, or strip-mine
coal, it denies your claim to control these resources. Property decrees
which members of society are winners and which ones are losers. In
the context of finite resources, property is a zero-sum game. Property
cannot be “private” because its very nature defies this description.
As a result, we are in the extremely odd situation in which the
mythology of constitutional rights is strongest in the area in which it is
49
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–15 (1992); Pa. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
50
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the most inapposite. To reconcile this contradiction, the exaltation of
the protection of private property interests by federal constitutional
fiat has been far more hortatory than real. If we look at the bottomline protection of property in takings cases, we find more often than
not that the legislative impairment of private interests prevails. For
instance, as commentators have often observed, under the “balancing” test that the federal courts often employ, the public interests almost always win, and the private interests almost always lose.51
Richard Epstein, in what I think is an accurate comment, writes that
under current takings doctrine, “virtually any asset is fair game for
obstruction by the political process, whether through taxation or
regulation.”52
What, then, should we make of this situation? We have an anomaly in which we subscribe most strongly to the individual-protectionist
mythology in the area in which it is the least real. Should we—as Alexander urges53—simply abandon this mythology and recognize property for what it is: a socially contingent and obligated right?
This question requires us to consider what we have not yet considered: the utilities and the dangers of the mythology itself.
There are, I believe, distinctly positive functions that this mythology serves. Scholars have pointed out that what I call the “mythology”
of property serves in important ways as a basis for popular limits on
the powers of government.54 The popular belief in the separateness
and sanctity of property will restrain government action even if it does
not do so in the way that the belief itself demands. Given the dangers
of majority trampling of minority rights, this is an important political
and legal function.
In addition, this mythical belief about the nature of the right to
property protection is rooted in a deep human psychological need.
Property rights in their various forms structure our daily lives, our
human relationships, and our assurance of physical survival. They dictate our ability to both realize our dreams and avoid our fears. We
believe that property rights are free-standing, individually protective,
and socially acontextual because we want to—we need to—believe this
myth.
On this ground, again, the mythology of property is very useful.
Believing in this mythology helps us sleep better at night and encour51

See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 94–95.
Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41,
56 (1992).
53
See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 11, 199–248.
54
See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 263 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds.,
1988) (pointing out that the “judicial practice does not seem as yet to have shaken the
popular force of the idea of property as a limit to the legitimate power of government”).

R

52

R
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ages our investment in the world around us. If we believe that our
property is protected, by the Constitution or otherwise, a positive
function is served: we live our lives accordingly. It is simply irrelevant
that the protection of these private interests is, in actuality, more hortatory than real.
All of this might mean that we are better off with the status quo.
Why should we sign onto Alexander’s campaign to force acknowledgment of a “social-obligation norm”55 when the mythology of property
causes no harm and confers distinct benefits? Perhaps we should ignore, or even celebrate, this mythology of property. As Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt keenly observed some thirty years ago,
transparency in societal decision making is not always possible or desirable in maintaining basic values or achieving social goals.56 Sometimes subterfuge and obfuscation are far more effective in achieving
the desired outcome.57 Perhaps Germany or South Africa needs this
transparency in its constitutional property scheme, but it could be argued that we are doing fine, or even better, believing in our property
“mythology” while at the same time living a very different property
“actuality.”
There is, however, a darker side to this mythology with which we
must reckon. The celebration of this mythic state assumes—indeed, it
depends on—a situation in which the difference between the mythology and the reality of the protection of property is not popularly
known. To work in a positive manner, society at large must believe in
the mythology of property’s protection, even though courts and legislatures are simultaneously implementing something that is quite
different.
For many years, this delicate balance between believed mythology
and legal actuality was, for the most part, preserved. During the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, discrete individuals or particular interest
groups might have been forced to confront the social contingency of
their property rights, but the issue was not one of general, popular
consciousness. The system was arguably in an uneasy but largely invisible equipoise.
With the regulatory revolution in the past few decades, particularly in land use, this situation has changed. Wetlands preservation,
the Endangered Species Act, ever-more restrictive zoning laws, shore55

See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 223–35.
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26 (1978).
57
See id. (recognizing that, although honesty about society’s choices may be the ideal
approach, “evasion, disguise, temporizing, [and] deception” may be necessary if society is
to “confront suffering without being willing to discard its values every time it cannot uphold them”); cf. Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 54, at 19 (discussing the value in excluding particularly divisible issues from the public sphere).
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line restrictions, historic preservation, and the like became household
concerns and the subjects of bitter rhetorical and political debate.
Highly articulate property-rights advocates have pushed to expose the
cognitive dissonance between property’s mythology and property’s
protection.58 The exposure of this gulf and the national government’s refusal to change our course has provoked a “politics of outrage” from commentators, legislators, and average citizens.59
Indeed, the courts’ failure to give greater credence to the mythological promise of property rights has worked to refocus the struggle
in the legislative arena. Those who insist that property rights are freestanding, individually protective, acontextual entities have had some
profound and disturbing success, particularly in state legislatures.
In 2004, Oregon voters passed “Measure 37.”60 This measure requires that if any state, city, county, or metropolitan government enacts or enforces any land use regulation that restricts the use of private
real property or any interest in it after the owner of that property or
any family member acquired it, the government must pay the owner
the reduction in fair market value of the affected property or forego
enforcement.61 “Land use regulations” include environmental laws,
state and local land conservation laws, local government comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, land division ordinances, transportation ordinances, rules regulating farming and forest practices, and any
other statute or local ordinance “regulating the use of land or any
interest therein.”62
The result has been predictable. Counties and other local governments are simply waiving challenged regulations rather than pay58
See, e.g., JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER
ASSAULT—AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (1997); NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA,
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1997); Epstein, supra note 52.
59
See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 35, at 127–28.
60
See William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures: Support Is Strong for Measures
Limiting Governments’ Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at 34.
61
See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (1), (2), (3)(E) (2005). The relevant portions of the
statute read as follows:
(1) If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to December 2, 2004, that restricts the use of private real property or any interest therein and has the
effect of reducing the fair market value of the property, or any interest
therein, then the owner of the property shall be paid just compensation.
(2) Just compensation shall be equal to the reduction in the fair market
value of the affected property interest resulting from enactment or enforcement of the land use regulation . . . .
Exceptions are “public nuisances under common law,” restrictions “for the protection of
public health and safety, such as fire and building codes, health and sanitation regulations,
solid or hazardous waste regulations, and pollution control regulations,” and restrictions
prohibiting the “selling [of] pornography or [the] perform[ance of] nude dancing.” Id.
§ 197.352 (3)(A), (B), (D).
62
See id. § 197.352 (11)(B).
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ing budget-busting damage awards.63 As of late 2006, aggrieved
parties had filed 2,446 claims with the state of Oregon, which would
cost more than $5.7 billion to reimburse.64 One landowner filed a
claim of $57 million, based on what his orchard would be worth if
divided into nearly 800 housing units.65 Measure 37 claims have
ranged from a desire to put a single additional house on a residential
lot, to the building of large housing developments, to an open-pit
mining operation.66 The new law pits neighbor against neighbor, as
landowners who relied on zoning and other laws to create value for
their property now find those laws crumbling in the face of their
neighbors’ claims. The orchard owner, asked about the fury that his
plan unleashed among his neighbors, replied, “Life is not equal . . . .
There is a law that got passed, and there is going to be a good amount
of whining going on.”67 This is, essentially, an assertion that “I am
entitled to my actions.” As one state senator put it, “Measure 37 blew
up our land-use system.”68
Nor is Oregon—one of the nation’s historically most progressive
land use states—alone on this issue. Ballot measures modeled on
Measure 37 are pending in California, Arizona, Idaho, and Washington.69 Similar legislation already exists in Florida, Mississippi, and
Louisiana.70 The Bert-Harris Property Rights Act, enacted in Florida,
calls for compensation if new government regulation negatively impacts “an existing fair market value” of property.71 Since its enactment, claims have been made against building height limitations,
density restrictions, communications tower restrictions, wetlands protections, tree protections, rental unit restrictions, historic building restrictions, and others.72 Individual property owners’ demands have
ranged from $40,000 to $23.5 million.73 In virtually every case that
one study found, state and local officials, faced with staggering costs,
63
See Yardley, supra note 60 (“‘Not a penny’ has been paid to property owners . . . .
Local governments, lacking money to pay, have simply waived the zoning rules.”); see also
Jeff Barnard, Growing Number of Counties Approving Property Rights Claims, ALBANY DEMOCRATHERALD, Feb. 11, 2005 at A6; Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in
Oregon, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2005, at A1.
64
See Ben Arnoldy, Topping 2006 Ballots: Eminent Domain. In November, 12 States Have
Initiatives on the Ballot That Seek to Protect Private Property Against Seizure and Regulation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Oct. 5, 2006, at 1.
65
See Harden, supra note 63.
66
See Barnard, supra note 63; Douglas Larson, Measure 37 Puts Newberry Crater at Risk,
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Sept. 11, 2006, at A11.
67
Harden, supra note 63 (quoting John M. Benton).
68
Id. (quoting Senator Charlie Ringo).
69
See Arnoldy, supra note 64; Yardley, supra note 60.
70
See George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial Takings” from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 278–79, 281 (2005).
71
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b) (West 2004).
72
Homsy, supra note 70, at 285–92.
73
See id. at 287.
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severely compromised or abandoned the enforcement or enactment
of the challenged regulation.74
How is it that these “takings” laws were enacted? The history in
Oregon is typical. The stories and comments that were used to fire
public passions for Measure 37 were replete with both belief in the
mythology of property and outrage at the exposure of its mythological
status. For instance, “[p]eople work hard to save enough money to
buy property. No one should take property without compensation –
not even the government.”75 “Measure 37 is very simple. If government takes your property, then government should pay for it.”76
“[O]ur founding fathers placed a high wall of protection around [this
right].”77 “Ballot Measure 37 will help [us] . . . recover what has been
stolen from us.”78 Property regulation is “theft.”79
These sentiments are undoubtedly real, and they are not without
foundation. Property regulation can yield injustice, and the need for
security through property is a powerful and undeniable demand of
human existence. However, both the extreme nature of these emotions as well as the complete lack of acknowledgment of property’s
necessary and unavoidable contextuality are startling. To say that
property is a “fortress” or regulation is “theft” is, quite frankly, incredible in view of property’s reciprocal reality. The campaigns cast the
debate as one of fairness, but, paradoxically, only consider the interests of the complaining property owner alone.80
There may have been a time when society could fairly well accommodate such beliefs—when available land was vast and population
pressures low. With our ever-increasing population and land use conflicts, however, such beliefs are dangerously anachronistic. When we
see such beliefs achieving legislative (as well as popular) ascendency,
74

See id. at 288–95.
State Legislators Support Measure 37, Argument in Favor, Measure 37 Arguments, in 2004
GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 107, 107, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/
elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_fav.html (last visited July 9, 2007).
76
Deschutes County Farm Bureau, Yes on Measure 37!, Argument in Favor, Measure 37
Arguments, in 2004 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra note 75, at 108.
77
Dennis Tuuri, Parents Education Association, Argument in Favor, Measure 37 Arguments, in 2004 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra note 75, at 117.
78
Dorothy English, Argument in Favor, Measure 37 Arguments, in 2004 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra note 75, at 105–06.
79
Ruth Pruitt, Argument in Favor, Measure 37 Arguments, in 2004 GENERAL ELECTION
VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra note 75, at 113 (“When Enron steals your life savings, it’s considered theft. When the City of Portland steals your life savings, it’s called ‘new regulation.’”).
80
See, e.g., Daniel Brook, How the West Was Lost, LEGAL AFF. Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 44, 48
(“Measure 37’s backers cast the debate as one about fairness and cost, not a referendum on
land use planning. . . . The hope, if one can call it that, for supporters of land use planning in Oregon is that the results of the referendum, which its opponents failed to describe before the election, will become clear afterward, as former farmland is bulldozed
and begins to bear a crop of subdivisions, Best Buys, and trailer parks.”).
75
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we must consider what has contributed to this situation in American
politics, culture, and law. No longer is this mythology of property simply an odd cultural quirk on which we, as policymakers, can remark
and forget. Rather, we must confront the role that this mythology
plays in shaping the social and political debates that, in turn, shape
our society and our laws.
It is in this context that I find Professor Alexander’s book—
among its many other virtues—such a vital contribution to the discourse about the real problems that we face. Through his presentation and analysis of other legal systems, systems with which we share
crucial values and assumptions, he shows us viable alternatives in a way
that simple theoretical argumentation cannot. Prior to this book, we
were vaguely aware that other legal systems have different treatments
of the protection of property, but we had no real reason or way to
relate those to our own. Through this book, Professor Alexander
shows us that this mythology of property is not necessary—in this case,
as a constitutional idea—to protect the legitimate contours of property protection. By examining the explicit contextuality of property
rights assumed in these other systems, he shows that squarely facing
property’s contextual nature need not push us down some slippery
slope in which all sense of the human need for property is lost. Furthermore, he shows us how this kind of honest and explicit examination will help us face the critical societal choices that property
necessarily, and inevitably, involves.
*****
In a recent article in the New York Times, we learn how the mayor
of Caracas, Venezuela—a place where shanty towns cover the City’s
hillsides—has ordered the “forced acquisition” of the Caracas Country
Club to make way for homes for as many as 11,500 poor families.81
“We’ve done studies that show that 20 families survive for a week on
what’s needed to maintain each square meter of grass on a golf
course,” the mayor explained.82 Needless to say, the possible destruction of this historic architectural and tropical gem, which was built in
the 1920s, has ignited a huge outcry.83 In this case, one can see both
sides. The human squalor in the shanty towns is appalling by any conceivable measure. On the other hand, I know the magical allure of
the place slated to be destroyed, having attended a magnificent party
there several years ago.
81
See Simon Romero, Caracas Mayor Lays Claim to Golf Links to House Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2006, at 3.
82
Id.
83
See id.
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We are fortunate in this country that we do not face such choices.
We read, with curiosity, Professor Alexander’s discussions of evictions
of thousands of squatters in South Africa84 and other foreign crises.
However, the global message of this book is that we are not as immune from these struggles as we think. Our struggles tend to be over
conflicting uses of land that are less shocking than the South African
example, but as long as property entails the distribution and use of
external, physical, finite resources, there will be conflict and strife.
This book shows us how we, in the United States, might begin a cultural and legal conversation about those real conflicts of the twentyfirst century.

84

See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 173–77.
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